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We propose a multi-agent logic of knowledge, public and arbitrary announcements, that is interpreted
on topological spaces in the style of subset space semantics. The arbitrary announcement modality
functions similarly to the effort modality in subset space logics, however, it comes with intuitive
and semantic differences. We provide axiomatizations for three logics based on this setting, and
demonstrate their completeness.
1 Introduction
In [15], Moss et al. introduce a bi-modal logic with language
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ϕ | Kϕ | 2ϕ,
called subset space logic (SSL), in order to formalize reasoning about sets and points together in one
modal system. The main interest in their investigation lies in spatial structures such as topological spaces
and using modal logic and the techniques behind for spatial reasoning, however, they also have a strong
motivation from epistemic logic. While the modality K is interpreted as knowledge, 2 intends to capture
the notion of effort, i.e., any action that results in increase in knowledge. They propose subset space
semantics for their logic. A subset space is defined to be a pair (X ,O), where X is a non-empty domain
and O is a collection of subsets of X (not necessarily a topology), wherein the modalities K and 2 are
evaluated with respect to pairs of the form (x,U), where x∈U ∈O . According to subset space semantics,
given a pair (x,U), the modality K quantifies over the elements of U , whereas 2 quantifies over all open
subsets of U that include the actual world x. Therefore, while knowledge is interpreted ‘locally’ in a
given observation set U , effort is read as open-set-shrinking where more effort corresponds to a smaller
neighbourhood, thus, a possible increase in knowledge. The schema 3Kϕ states that after some effort
the agent comes to know ϕ where effort can be in the form of measurement, observation, computation,
approximation [15, 8, 16, 5], or announcement [17, 1, 10].
The epistemic motivation behind the subset space semantics and the dynamic nature of the effort
modality suggests a link between SSL and dynamic epistemic logic, in particular dynamics known as
public announcement [4, 5, 3, 19, 6]. The works [4, 5, 3] propose modelling public announcements on
subset spaces by deleting the states or the neighbourhoods falsifying the announcement. This dynamic
epistemic method is not in the spirit of the effort modality: dynamic epistemic actions result in global
model change, whereas the effort modality results in local neighbourhood shrinking. Hence, it is natural
to search for an ‘open-set-shrinking-like’ interpretation of public announcements on subset spaces. To
best of our knowledge, Wang and A˚gotnes [19] were the first to propose semantics for public announce-
ments on subset spaces in the style of the effort modality, although this is not necessarily on topological
spaces. Bjorndahl [6] then proposed a revised version of the [19] semantics. In contrast to the afore-
mentioned proposals, Bjorndahl uses models based on topological spaces to interpret knowledge and
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information change via public announcements. He considers the language
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ϕ | Kϕ | int(ϕ) | [ϕ]ϕ,
where int(ϕ)means ‘ϕ is true and can be announced’, and where [ϕ]ψ means ‘after public announcement
of ϕ , ψ .’
In [1], Balbiani et al. introduce a logic to quantify over announcements in the setting of epistemic
logic based on the language (with single-agent version here)
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ϕ | Kϕ | [ϕ]ϕ | 2ϕ.
In this case, unlike above, 2ϕ means ‘after any announcement, ϕ (is true)’ so that 2 quantifies over
epistemically definable subsets (2-free formulas of the language) of a given model. In this case, 3Kϕ
again means that the agent comes to know ϕ , but in the interpretation that there is a formula ψ such that
after announcing it the agent knows ϕ . What becomes true or known by an agent after an announcement
can be expressed in this language without explicit reference to the announced formula.
Clearly, the meaning of the effort 2 modality and of the arbitrary announcement 2 modality are
related in motivation. In both cases, interpreting the modality requires quantification over sets. Subset-
space-like semantics provides natural tools for this. In [10], we extended Bjorndahl’s proposal [6] with
an arbitrary announcement modality
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ϕ | Kϕ | int(ϕ) | [ϕ]ϕ | 2ϕ
and provided topological semantics for the 2 modality, and proved completeness for the corresponding
single-agent logic APALint.
In the current proposal we generalize this approach to a multi-agent setting. Multi-agent subset space
logics have been investigated in [13, 14, 4, 18]. There are some challenges with such a logic concerning
the evaluation of higher-order knowledge. The general setup is for any finite number of agents, but to
demonstrate the challenges, consider the case of two agents. Suppose for each of two agents i and j there
is an open set such that the semantic primitive becomes a triple (x,Ui,U j) instead of a pair (x,U). Now
consider a formula like KiKˆ jKi p, for ‘agent i knows that agent j considers possible that agent i knows
proposition p’. If this is true for a triple (x,Ui,U j), then Kˆ jKi p must be true for any y ∈Ui; but y may
not be in U j, in which case (y,Ui,U j) is not well-defined: we cannot interpret Kˆ jKi p. Our solution to this
dilemma is to consider neighbourhoods that are not only relative to each agent, as usual in multi-agent
subset space logics, but that are also relative to each state. This amounts to, when shifting the viewpoint
from x to y ∈Ui, in (x,Ui,U j), we simultaneously have to shift the neighbourhood (and not merely the
point in the actual neighbourhood) for the other agent. So we then go from (x,Ui,U j) to (y,Ui,Vj), where
Vj may be different from U j. If they are different, their intersection should be empty.
In order to define the evaluation neighbourhood for each agent with respect to the state in question,
we employ a technique inspired by the standard neighbourhood semantics [7]. We use a set of neigh-
bourhood functions, determining the evaluation neighbourhood relative to both the given state and the
corresponding agent. These functions need to be partial in order to render the semantics well-defined for
the dynamic modalities in the system.
In Section 2 we define the syntax, structures, and semantics of our multi-agent logic of arbitrary
public announcements, APALint, interpreted on topological spaces equipped with a set of neighbourhood
functions. Without arbitrary announcements we get the logic PALint , and with neither arbitrary nor public
announcements, the logic ELint . In this section we also show some typical validities of the logic, and
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give a detailed example. In Section 3 we give axiomatizations for the logics: PALint extends ELint and
APALint extends PALint . In Section 4 we demonstrate completeness for these logics. The completeness
proof for the epistemic version of the logic, ELint , is rather different from the completeness proof for the
full logic APALint . We then compare our work to that of others (Section 5) and conclude.
2 The logic APALint
We define the syntax, structures, and semantics of our logic. From now on, Prop is a countable set of
propositional variables and A a finite and non-empty set of agents.
2.1 Syntax
Definition 1 The languageLAPALint is defined by
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ϕ | Kiϕ | int(ϕ) | [ϕ]ϕ | 2ϕ
where p∈Prop and i∈A . Abbreviations for the connectives ∨,→ and↔ are standard, and⊥ is defined
as abbreviation by p∧¬p. We employ Kˆi for ¬Ki¬ϕ , and3ϕ for ¬2¬ϕ . We denote the non-modal part
ofLAPALint (without the modalities Ki, int, [ϕ] and 2) byLPl , the part without 2 byLPALint , and the part
without 2 and [ϕ] byLELint .
Necessity forms [12] allow us to select unique occurrences of a subformula in a given formula (unlike in
uniform substitution). They will be used in the axiomatization (Section 3).
Definition 2 Let ϕ ∈LAPALint . The necessity forms are inductively defined as
ξ (]) := ] | ϕ → ξ (]) | Kiξ (]) | int(ξ (])) | [ϕ]ξ (]).
It is not hard to see that each necessity form ξ (]) has a unique occurrence of ]. Given a necessity form
ξ (]) and a formula ϕ ∈LAPALint , the formula obtained by replacing ] by ϕ is denoted by ξ (ϕ).
In the completeness proof (Section 4) we use a complexity measure on formulas based on the size
and 2-depth of formulas where the size of a formula is a weighted count of the number of symbols and
2-depth counts the number of the2-modalities occurring in a formula. The measure was first introduced
in [2].
Definition 3 The size S(ϕ) of a formula ϕ ∈LAPALint is defined as: S(p) = 1, S(¬ϕ) = S(ϕ)+1, S(ϕ ∧
ψ) = S(ϕ)+S(ψ), S(Kiϕ) = S(ϕ)+1, S(int(ϕ)) = S(ϕ)+1, S([ϕ]ψ) = S(ϕ)+4S(ψ), and S(2ϕ) =
S(ϕ)+1.
The factor 4 in the clause for [ϕ]ψ is to ensure Lemma 7. Although the choice of the number 4 might
seem arbitrary, it is the smallest natural number guaranteeing the desired result (see the proof of Lemma
7).
Definition 4 The2-depth of a formula ϕ ∈LAPALint , denoted by d(ϕ), is defined as: d(p) = 0, d(¬ϕ) =
d(ϕ), d(ϕ ∧ψ) = max{d(ϕ),d(ψ)}, d(Kiϕ) = d(ϕ), d(int(ϕ)) = d(ϕ), d([ϕ]ψ) = max{d(ϕ),d(ψ)},
and d(2ϕ) = d(ϕ)+1.
We now define three order relations onLAPALint based on the size and 2-depth of the formulas.
Definition 5 For any ϕ,ψ ∈LAPALint ,
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• ϕ <S ψ iff S(ϕ)< S(ψ)
• ϕ <d ψ iff d(ϕ)< d(ψ)
• ϕ <Sd ψ iff (either d(ϕ)< d(ψ), or d(ϕ) = d(ψ) and S(ϕ)< S(ψ))
We let Sub(ϕ) denote the set of subformulas of a given formula ϕ .
Lemma 6 For any ϕ,ψ ∈LAPALint ,
1. <S,<d , <Sd are well-founded strict partial orders between formulas inLAPALint ,
2. ϕ ∈ Sub(ψ) implies ϕ <Sd ψ ,
3. int(ϕ)<Sd [ϕ]ψ ,
4. ϕ ∈LPALint iff d(ϕ) = 0,
5. ϕ ∈LPALint implies [ϕ]ψ <Sd 2ψ .
Lemma 7 For any ϕ,ψ,χ ∈LAPALint and i ∈A ,
1. ¬[ϕ]ψ <Sd [ϕ]¬ψ ,
2. int([ϕ]ψ)<Sd [ϕ]int(ψ),
3. Ki[ϕ]ψ <Sd [ϕ]Kiψ ,
4. [¬[ϕ]¬int(ψ)]χ <Sd [ϕ][ψ]χ .
Proof We only prove Lemma 7.4. The proof demonstrates why in the [ϕ]ψ clause of Definition 3, 4 is
the smallest natural number guaranteeing the result.
By Definition 3, we have that S([¬[ϕ]¬int(ψ)]χ) = S(ϕ)+4S(ψ)+4S(χ)+9 and that S([ϕ][ψ]χ) =
S(ϕ)+4S(ψ)+16S(χ). As for any χ ∈LAPALint , 1≤ S(χ), it follows that 4S(χ)+9≤ 4S(χ)+9S(χ) =
13S(χ)< 16S(χ). Further, we observe that d([¬[ϕ]¬int(ψ)]χ)=max{d(ϕ),d(ψ),d(χ)}= d([ϕ][ψ]χ).
(This is similar in the first three items.)
2.2 Background
In this section, we introduce the topological concepts that will be used throughout this paper. All the
concepts in this section can be found in [11].
Definition 8 A topological space (X ,τ) is a pair consisting of a non-empty set X and a family τ of
subsets of X satisfying /0 ∈ τ and X ∈ τ , and closed under finite intersections and arbitrary unions.
The set X is called the space. The subsets of X belonging to τ are called open sets (or opens) in the
space; the family τ of open subsets of X is also called a topology on X . If for some x ∈ X and an open
U ⊆ X we have x ∈U , we say that U is an open neighborhood of x.
A point x is called an interior point of a set A⊆ X if there is an open neighborhood U of x such that
U ⊆ A. The set of all interior points of A is called the interior of A and denoted by Int(A). We can then
easily observe that for any A⊆ X , Int(A) is the largest open subset of A.
Definition 9 A family B ⊆ τ is called a base for a topological space (X ,τ) if every non-empty open
subset of X can be written as a union of elements of B.
Given any family Σ = {Aα | α ∈ I} of subsets of X , there exists a unique, smallest topology τ(Σ)
with Σ ⊆ τ(Σ) [11, Th. 3.1]. The family τ(Σ) consists of /0, X , all finite intersections of the Aα , and
all arbitrary unions of these finite intersections. Σ is called a subbase for τ(Σ), and τ(Σ) is said to be
generated by Σ. The set of finite intersections of members of Σ forms a base for τ(Σ).
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2.3 Structures
In this section we define our multi-agent models based on topological spaces.
Definition 10 Given a topological space (X ,τ), a neighbourhood function set Φ on (X ,τ) is a set of
partial functions θ : X ⇀A → τ such that for all x,y ∈ Dom(θ), for all i ∈A , and for all U ∈ τ:
1. θ(x)(i) ∈ τ ,
2. x ∈ θ(x)(i),
3. θ(x)(i)⊆ Dom(θ),
4. if y ∈ θ(x)(i) then θ(x)(i) = θ(y)(i),
5. θ |U ∈Φ,
where θ |U is the partial function with Dom(θ |U) = Dom(θ)∩U and θ |U(x)(i) = θ(x)(i)∩U. We call
the elements of Φ neighbourhood functions.
Definition 11 A topological model with functions (or in short, a topo-model) is a tupleM =(X ,τ,Φ,V ),
where (X ,τ) is a topological space,Φ a neighbourhood function set, and V : Prop→ X a valuation func-
tion. We refer to the partX = (X ,τ,Φ) without the valuation function as a topo-frame.
A pair (x,θ) is a neighbourhood situation if x ∈ Dom(θ) and θ(x)(i) is called the epistemic neigh-
bourhood at x of agent i. If (x,θ) is a neighbourhood situation inM we write (x,θ) ∈M . Similarly, if
(x,θ) is a neighbourhood situation inX we write (x,θ) ∈X .
Lemma 12 For any (X ,τ,Φ) and θ ∈Φ, Dom(θ) ∈ τ .
2.4 Semantics
Definition 13 Given a topo-model M = (X ,τ,Φ,V ) and a neighbourhood situation (x,θ) ∈M , the
semantics for the languageLAPALint is defined recursively as:
M ,(x,θ) |= p iff x ∈V (p)
M ,(x,θ) |= ¬ϕ iff notM ,(x,θ) |= ϕ
M ,(x,θ) |= ϕ ∧ψ iff M ,(x,θ) |= ϕ andM ,(x,θ) |= ψ
M ,(x,θ) |= Kiϕ iff (∀y ∈ θ(x)(i))(M ,(y,θ) |= ϕ)
M ,(x,θ) |= int(ϕ) iff x ∈ Int[[ϕ]]θ
M ,(x,θ) |= [ϕ]ψ iff M ,(x,θ) |= int(ϕ)⇒M ,(x,θϕ) |= ψ
M ,(x,θ) |=2ϕ iff (∀ψ ∈LPALint)(M ,(x,θ) |= [ψ]ϕ)
where p ∈ Prop, [[ϕ]]θ = {y ∈ Dom(θ) |M ,(y,θ) |= ϕ} and θϕ : X ⇀ A → τ such that Dom(θϕ) =
Int[[ϕ]]θ and θϕ(x)(i) = θ(x)(i)∩ Int[[ϕ]]θ .
The updated neighbourhood function θϕ is the restriction of θ to the open set Int[[ϕ]]θ , i.e., for all x ∈ X ,
θϕ(x)(i) = θ |Int[[ϕ]]θ (x)(i).
A formula ϕ ∈ LAPALint is valid in a topo-model M , denoted M |= ϕ , iff M ,(x,θ) |= ϕ for all
(x,θ) ∈M ; ϕ is valid, denoted |= ϕ , iff for all topo-models M we have M |= ϕ . Soundness and
completeness with respect to topo-models are defined as usual.
Let us now elaborate on the structure of topo-models and the above semantics we have proposed
for LAPALint . Given a topo-model (X ,τ,Φ,V ), the epistemic neighbourhoods of each agent at a given
state x are determined by (partial) functions θ : X ⇀ A → τ assigning an open neighbourhood to the
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state in question for each agent. We allow for partial functions in Φ, and close Φ under taking restricted
functions θ |U where U ∈ τ (see Definition 10, condition 5), so that updated neighbourhood functions
are guaranteed to be well-defined elements of Φ. As in the standard subset space semantics, by picking
a neighbourhood situation (x,θ), we first localize our focus to an open subdomain, in fact to Dom(θ),
including the state x and the epistemic neighbourhood of each agent at x determined by θ . Then the
function θ(x) designates an epistemic neighbourhood for each agent i in A . It is guaranteed that every
agent i is assigned a neighbourhood by θ at every state x in Dom(θ), since each θ(x) is defined to be a
total function fromA to τ . Moreover, condition 2 of Definition 10 ensures that /0 cannot be an epistemic
neighbourhood, i.e., θ(x)(i) 6= /0 for all x ∈ Dom(θ). Finally, conditions 2 and 4 of Definition 10 make
sure that the S5 axioms for each Ki are sound with respect to all topo-models.
We now provide some semantic results. As usual in the subset space setting, truth of non-modal
formulas only depends on the state in question.
Proposition 14 Give a topo-model M = (X ,τ,Φ,V ), neighbourhood situations (x,θ1),(x,θ2) ∈M ,
and a formula ϕ ∈LPl . Then (x,θ1) |= ϕ iff (x,θ2) |= ϕ .
Proposition 15 GivenM = (X ,τ,Φ,V ), θ ∈Φ and ϕ ∈LAPALint . Then [[int(ϕ)]]θ = Int[[ϕ]]θ .
Proof
[[int(ϕ)]]θ = {y ∈ Dom(θ) | (y,θ) |= int(ϕ)}
= {y ∈ Dom(θ) | y ∈ Int[[ϕ]]θ}
= Int[[ϕ]]θ (since Int[[ϕ]]θ ⊆ Dom(θ))
A corollary is that Int[[int(ϕ)]]θ = IntInt[[ϕ]]θ = Int[[ϕ]]θ .
Proposition 16
1. |= [ϕ]ψ ↔ [int(ϕ)]ψ
2. |= (int(ϕ)∧〈ϕ〉int(ψ))↔ 〈ϕ〉int(ψ)
Proposition 17
1. [[ψ]]θϕ = [[〈ϕ〉ψ]]θ
2. θϕ = θ int(ϕ)
3. (θϕ)ψ = θ 〈ϕ〉int(ψ)
2.5 Example
We illustrate our logic by a multi-agent version of Bjorndahl’s convincing example in [6] about the jewel
in the tomb. Indiana Jones (i) and Emile Belloq (e) are both scouring for a priceless jewel placed in a
tomb. The tomb could either contain a jewel or not, the tomb could have been rediscovered in modern
times or not, and (beyond [6]), the tomb could be in the Valley of Tombs in Egypt or not. The proposi-
tional variables corresponding to these propositions are, respectively, j, d, and t. We represent a valua-
tion of these variables by a triple xyz, where x,y,z ∈ {0,1}. Given carrier set X = {xyz | x,y,z ∈ {0,1}},
the topology τ that we consider is generated by the base consisting of the subsets {000,100,001,101},
{010}, {110}, {011}, {111}. The idea is that one can only conceivably know (or learn) about the jewel
or the location, on condition that the tomb has been discovered. Therefore, {000,100,001,101} has no
strict subsets besides empty set: if the tomb has not yet been discovered, no one can have any information
about the jewel or the location.
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A topo-modelM = (X ,τ,Φ,V ) for this topology (X ,τ) has Φ as the set of all neighbourhood func-
tions that are partitions of X for both agents, and restrictions of these functions to open sets. A typical
θ ∈Φ describes complete ignorance of both agents and is defined as θ(s)(i) = θ(s)(e) = X . This corre-
sponds most to the situation described in [6]. A more interesting neighbourhood situation in this model
is one wherein Indiana and Emile have different knowledge. Let us assume that Emile has the advantage
over Indiana so far, as he knows the location of the tomb but Indiana doesn’t. This is the θ ′ such that for
all x ∈ X , θ ′(x)(i) = X whereas the partition for Emile consists of sets {101,100,001,000}, {111,011},
{110,010}, i.e., θ ′(111)(e) = {111,011}, etc.
We now can evaluate what Emile knows about Indiana at 111, and confirm that this goes beyond
Emil’s initial epistemic neighbourhood. This situation however does not create any problems in our
setting since Indiana’s epistemic neighbourhoods will be determined relative to the states in Emile’s
initial neighbourhood. Firstly, Emile knows that the tomb is in the Valley of Tombs in Egypt
M ,(111,θ ′) |= Ket
and he also knows that Indiana does not know that
M ,(111,θ ′) |= Ke¬(Ki¬t ∨Kit)
The latter involves verifying M ,(111,θ ′) |= Kˆit and M ,(111,θ ′) |= Kˆi¬t. And this is true because
θ ′(111)(i) = X , and 000,001 ∈ X , and while M ,(001,θ ′) |= t, we also have M ,(000,θ ′) |= ¬t. We
can also check that Emile knows that Indiana considers it possible that Emile doesn’t know the tomb’s
location
M ,(111,θ ′) |= KeKˆi¬(Ket ∨Ke¬t)
Announcements will change their knowledge in different ways. Consider the announcement of j. This
results in Emile knowing everything but Indiana still being uncertain about the location.
M ,(111,θ ′) |= [ j](Ke( j∧d∧ t)∧Ki( j∧d)∧¬Ki(t ∨Ki¬t))
Model checking this involves computing the epistemic neighbourhoods of both agents given by the up-
dated neighbourhood function (θ ′) j at 111. Observe that Int[[ j]]θ ′ = {111,110}. Therefore,
(θ ′) j(111)(e) = Int[[ j]]θ ′ ∩θ ′(111)(e) = {111} and (θ ′) j(111)(i) = Int[[ j]]θ ′ ∩θ ′(x)(i) = {111,110}.
There is an announcement after which Emile and Indiana know everything (for example the an-
nouncement of j∧ t):
M ,(111,θ) |=3(Ke( j∧d∧ t)∧Ki( j∧d∧ t))
As long as the tomb has not been discovered, nothing will make Emile (or Indiana) learn that it contains
a jewel or where the tomb is located:
M |= ¬d→2(¬(Ke j∨Ke¬ j)∧¬(Ket ∨Ke¬t))
3 Axiomatization
We now provide the axiomatizations of ELint, PALint, and APALint, and prove their soundness and com-
pleteness with respect to the proposed semantics.
Definition 18 The axiomatization APALint is given in Table 1. The axiomatization PALint is the one
without (DR5) and (R7). We get ELint if we further remove axioms (R1)-(R6) and the rule (DR4).
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(P) all instantiations of propositional tautologies
(K-K) Ki(ϕ → ψ)→ (Kiϕ → Kiψ)
(K-T) Kiϕ → ϕ
(K-4) Kiϕ → KiKiϕ
(K-5) ¬Kiϕ → Ki¬Ki¬ϕ
(int-K) int(ϕ → ψ)→ (int(ϕ)→ int(ψ))
(int-T) int(ϕ)→ ϕ
(int-4) int(ϕ)→ int(int(ϕ))
(Kint) Kiϕ → int(ϕ)
(R1) [ϕ]p↔ (int(ϕ)→ p)
(R2) [ϕ]¬ψ ↔ (int(ϕ)→¬[ϕ]ψ)
(R3) [ϕ](ψ ∧χ)↔ [ϕ]ψ ∧ [ϕ]χ
(R4) [ϕ]int(ψ)↔ (int(ϕ)→ int([ϕ]ψ))
(R5) [ϕ]Kiψ ↔ (int(ϕ)→ Ki[ϕ]ψ)
(R6) [ϕ][ψ]χ ↔ [¬[ϕ]¬int(ψ)]χ
(R7) 2ϕ → [χ]ϕ where χ ∈LPALint
(DR1) From ϕ and ϕ → ψ , infer ψ
(DR2) From ϕ , infer Kiϕ
(DR3) From ϕ , infer int(ϕ)
(DR4) From ϕ , infer [ψ]ϕ
(DR5) From ξ ([ψ]χ) for all ψ ∈LPALint , infer ξ (2χ)
Table 1: Axiomatizations ELint, PALint, and APALint
The parts (DR1) to (DR5) are the derivation rules and the other parts are the axioms. A formula is a
theorem of APALint, notation ` ϕ , if it belongs to the smallest set of formulas containing the axioms and
closed under the derivation rules. (Similarly for ELint and PALint.)
Lemma 19 Axiomatization APALint satisfies substitution of equivalents. If ` ϕ ↔ ψ , then ` χ[p/ϕ]↔
χ[p/ψ].
Proof In the above, χ[p/ϕ] means uniform substitution of ϕ for p. The proof is not trivial but proceeds
along similar lines as for public announcement logic, see [9].
Proposition 20 [ϕ]⊥↔¬int(ϕ) is a theorem of APALint.
Proposition 21 APALint is sound with respect to the class of all topo-models.
Proof LetM = (X ,τ,Φ,V ) be a topo-model, (x,θ) ∈M and ϕ,ψ,χ ∈LAPALint . We show three cases.
(Kint) Suppose (x,θ) |=Kiϕ . This means, (y,θ) |= ϕ for all y∈ θ(x)(i). Hence, θ(x)(i)⊆ [[ϕ]]θ . By
Definition 10, θ(x)(i) is an open neighbourhood of x, therefore we have x∈ Int[[ϕ]]θ , i.e., (x,θ) |= int(ϕ).
(R7) Let χ ∈LPALint and suppose (x,θ) |= 2ϕ . By the semantics, we have (x,θ) |= 2ϕ iff (∀ψ ∈
LPALint)((x,θ) |= [ψ]ϕ). Therefore, in particular, (x,θ) |= [χ]ϕ .
(DR5) Suppose ξ ([ψ]χ) is valid for all ψ ∈LPALint . The proof follows by induction on the com-
plexity of ξ (]). In case ξ (]) = ], we have ξ ([ψ]χ) = [ψ]χ . By assumption, we have that [ψ]χ is valid for
all ψ ∈LPALint . This impliesM ,(x,θ) |= [ψ]χ for all ψ ∈LPALint , all topo-modelsM , and (x,θ) ∈M .
Therefore, by the semantics, M ,(x,θ) |= 2χ , i.e., M ,(x,θ) |= ξ (2χ). All other, inductive, cases are
elementary.
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Corollary 22 The axiomatizations ELint and PALint are sound with respect to the class of all topo-
models.
4 Completeness
We now show completeness for ELint, PALint, and APALint with respect to the class of all topo-models.
Completeness of ELint is shown in a standard way via a canonical model construction and a Truth Lemma
that is proved by induction on formula complexity. Completeness for PALint is shown by reducing each
formula inLPALint to an equivalent formula ofLELint . The proof of the completeness for APALint becomes
more involved. Reduction axioms for public announcements no longer suffice in the APALint case, and
the inductive proof needs a subinduction where announcements are considered. Moreover, the proof
system of APALint has an infinitary derivation rule, namely the rule (DR5), and given the requirement of
closure under this rule, the maximally consistent sets for that case are defined to be maximally consistent
theories (see, Section 4.2). Lastly, the Truth Lemma requires the more complicated complexity measure
on formulas defined in Section 2. There, we need to adapt the completeness proof of [2] to our setting.
4.1 Completeness of ELint and PALint
ForLELint we define consistent and maximally consistent sets in the usual way, see e.g. [6] for details, and
the multi-agent aspect does not complicate the definition. Let Xc be the set of all maximally consistent
sets of ELint. We define relations ∼i on Xc as x∼i y iff ∀ϕ ∈LELint(Kiϕ ∈ x iff Kiϕ ∈ y). Notice that the
latter is equivalent to: ∀ϕ ∈LELint(Kiϕ ∈ x implies ϕ ∈ y) since Ki is an S5 modality. As each Ki is of S5
type, every ∼i is an equivalence relation, hence, it induces equivalence classes on Xc. Let [x]i denote the
equivalence class of x induced by the relation ∼i. Moreover, we define ϕ̂ = {y ∈ Xc | ϕ ∈ y}. Observe
that x ∈ ϕ̂ iff ϕ ∈ x.
Lemma 23 (Lindenbaum’s Lemma) Each consistent
set can be extended to a maximally consistent set.
Definition 24 We define the canonical model
X c = (Xc,τc,Φc,V c) as follows:
• Xc is the set of all maximally consistent sets;
• τc is the topological space generated by the subbase
Σ= {[x]i∩ înt(ϕ) | x ∈ Xc,ϕ ∈LELint and i ∈A };
• x ∈V c(p) iff p ∈ x, for all p ∈ Prop;
• Φc = {θ ∗|U |U ∈ τc}, where we define θ ∗ : Xc→A → τc as θ ∗(x)(i) = [x]i, for x∈ Xc and i∈A .
Observe that, since înt(>) = Xc, we have [x]i∩ înt(>) = [x]i ∈ Σ for each i. Therefore, each [x]i is an
open subset of Xc. Moreover, the elements of Φc satisfy the required properties given in Definition 10.
Lemma 25 (Truth Lemma) For every ϕ ∈LELint and for each x ∈ Xc, ϕ ∈ x iffX c,(x,θ ∗) |= ϕ.
Proof Cases for the propositional variables and Booleans are straightforward. We only show the cases
for Ki and int.
Case ϕ := Kiψ
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(⇒) Suppose Kiψ ∈ x and let y ∈ θ ∗(x)(i). Since y ∈ θ ∗(x)(i) = [x]i, by definition of ∼i, we
have Kiψ ∈ y. Then, by T-axiom for Ki, we obtain ψ ∈ y. Then, by IH, X c,(y,θ ∗) |= ψ . Therefore
X c,(x,θ ∗) |= Kiψ .
(⇐) Suppose Kiψ 6∈ x. Then, {Kiγ | Kiγ ∈ x}∪ {¬ψ} is a consistent set. We can then extend it
to a maximally consistent set y. As {Kiγ | Kiγ ∈ x} ⊆ y, we have y ∈ [x]i meaning that y ∈ θ ∗(x)(i).
Moreover, since ¬ψ ∈ y, ψ 6∈ y. Therefore, we have a maximally consistent set y ∈ θ ∗(x)(i) such that
ψ 6∈ y. By (IH),X c,(y,θ ∗) 6|= ψ . Hence,X c,(x,θ ∗) 6|= Kiψ .
Case ϕ := int(ψ)
(⇒) Suppose int(ψ) ∈ x. Consider the set [x]i∩ înt(ψ) for some i ∈A . Obviously, x ∈ [x]i∩ înt(ψ)
and [x]i∩ înt(ψ) is open (since it is in Σ). Now let y ∈ [x]i∩ înt(ψ). Since y ∈ înt(ψ), int(ψ) ∈ y. Then,
by (int -T), since y is maximal consistent, we have ψ ∈ y. Thus, by IH, we have (y,θ ∗) |= ψ . Therefore,
y ∈ [[ψ]]θ ∗ . This implies [x]i∩ înt(ψ)⊆ [[ψ]]θ ∗ . And, since x ∈ [x]i∩ înt(ψ) ∈ τc, we have x ∈ Int[[ψ]]θ ∗ ,
i.e., (x,θ ∗) |= int(ψ).
(⇐) Suppose (x,θ ∗) |= int(ψ), i.e., x ∈ Int[[ψ]]θ ∗ . Recall that the set of finite intersections of the
elements of Σ forms a base, which we denote by BΣ, for τc. x ∈ Int[[ψ]]θ ∗ implies that there exists an
open U ∈ BΣ such that x ∈U ⊆ [[ψ]]θ ∗ . Given the construction of BΣ, U is of the form
U =
⋂
i∈I1
[x1]i∩ . . .
⋂
i∈In
[xk]i∩
⋂
η∈Formfin
înt(η)
where I1, . . . , In are finite subsets of A , x1 . . .xk ∈ Xc and Formfin is a finite subset ofLELint . Since int is
a normal modality, we can simply write
U =
⋂
i∈I1
[x1]i∩ . . .
⋂
i∈In
[xk]i∩ înt(γ),
where
∧
η∈Formfin
η := γ . Since x is in each [x j]i with 1≤ j≤ k, we have [x j]i = [x]i for all such j. Therefore,
we have
x ∈U = (
⋂
i∈I
[x]i)∩ înt(γ)⊆ [[ψ]]θ ∗ ,
where I = I1∪·· ·∪ In.
This implies, for all y ∈ (⋂
i∈I
[x]i), if y ∈ înt(γ) then ψ ∈ y. From this, we can say ⋃
i∈I
{Kiσ | Kiσ ∈ x} `
int(γ)→ ψ . Then, there is a finite subset Γ ⊆ ⋃
i∈I
{Kiσ | Kiσ ∈ x} such that ` ∧
λ∈Γ
λ → (int(γ)→ ψ). It
then follows:
1. ` int( ∧
λ∈Γ
λ → (int(γ)→ ψ)) (DR3)
2. ` int( ∧
λ∈Γ
λ )→ int(int(γ)→ ψ)) (int-K) and (DR1)
3. ` ( ∧
λ∈Γ
int(λ ))→ int(int(γ)→ ψ)) (int-K)
Observe that each λ ∈ Γ is of the form K jα for some K jα ∈ ⋃
i∈I
{Kiσ | Kiσ ∈ x} and we have `
Kiϕ ↔ int(Kiϕ). Therefore, ` ( ∧
λ∈Γ
λ )→ int(int(γ)→ ψ)). Thus, since ∧
λ∈Γ
λ ∈ x (by Γ ⊆ x), we have
int(int(γ)→ ψ)) ∈ x. Then, by (int-K), (DR1) and since ` int(int(γ))↔ int(γ) and x ∈ înt(γ) (i.e.,
int(γ) ∈ x) , we obtain int(ψ) ∈ x.
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Theorem 26 ELint is complete with respect to the class of all topo-models.
Theorem 27 PALint is complete with respect to the class of all topo-models.
Proof This follows from Theorem 26 by reduction in a standard way. The occurrences of the modality
int on the right-hand-side of the reduction axioms (axioms (R1)-(R6)) should not lead to any confusion:
extending the complexity measure defined in [9, Definition 7.21 p. 187] to the language LPALint by
adding the same complexity measure for the modality int as for Ki gives us the desired result.
4.2 Completeness of APALint
We now reuse the technique of [2] in the setting of topological semantics. Given the closure requirement
under derivation rule (DR5) it seems more proper to call maximally consistent sets of APALint maximally
consistent theories, as further explained below.
Definition 28 A set x of formulas is called a theory iff APALint ⊆ x and x is closed under (DR1) and
(DR5). A theory x is said to be consistent iff ⊥ 6∈ x. A theory x is maximally consistent iff x is consistent
and any set of formulas properly containing x is inconsistent.
Observe that APALint constitutes the smallest theory. Moreover, maximally consistent theories of APALint
posses the usual properties of maximally consistent sets:
Proposition 29 For any maximally consistent theory x, ϕ 6∈ x iff ¬ϕ ∈ x, and ϕ ∧ψ ∈ x iff ϕ ∈ x and
ψ ∈ x.
In the setting of our axiomatization based on the infinitary rule (DR5), we will say that a set x of
formulas is consistent iff there exists a consistent theory y such that x⊆ y. Obviously, maximal consistent
theories are maximal consistent sets of formulas. Under the given definition of consistency for sets of
formulas, maximal consistent sets of formulas are also maximal consistent theories.
Definition 30 Let ϕ ∈LAPALint and i ∈A . Then x+ϕ := {ψ | ϕ → ψ ∈ x} and Kix := {ϕ | Kiϕ ∈ x}.
Lemma 31 For any theory x of APALint and
ϕ ∈LAPALint , x+ϕ is a theory and it contains x and ϕ , and Kix is a theory.
Lemma 32 Let ϕ ∈LAPALint . For all theories x, x+ϕ is consistent iff ¬ϕ 6∈ x.
Proof Let ϕ ∈LAPALint and x be a theory. Then ¬ϕ ∈ x iff ϕ →⊥ ∈ x (as ¬ϕ ↔ ϕ →⊥ is a theorem)
iff ⊥ ∈ x+ϕ . Therefore, x+ϕ is inconsistent iff ¬ϕ ∈ x, i.e., x+ϕ is consistent iff ¬ϕ 6∈ x.
Lemma 33 (Lindenbaum’s Lemma [1]) Each consistent theory can be extended to a maximal consis-
tent theory.
Lemma 34 If Kiϕ 6∈ x, then there is a maximally consistent theory y such that Kix⊆ y and ϕ 6∈ y.
Proof Let ϕ ∈LAPALint and x be such that Kiϕ 6∈ x. Thus, ϕ 6∈ Kix. Hence, by Lemma 32, Kix+¬ϕ
is consistent. Then, by Lemma 33, there exists a maximally consistent set y such that Kix+¬ϕ ⊆ y.
Therefore Kix⊆ y and ϕ 6∈ y.
Lemma 35 For all ϕ ∈LAPALint and all maximally consistent theories x, 2ϕ ∈ x iff for all ψ ∈LPALint ,
[ψ]ϕ ∈ x.
Proof Let ϕ ∈LAPALint and x be a maximally consistent theory.
(⇒) Suppose 2ϕ ∈ x. Then, by (R7) and (DR1), we have [ψ]ϕ ∈ x for all ψ ∈LPALint .
(⇐) Suppose [ψ]ϕ ∈ x for all ψ ∈LPALint . Consider the necessity form ]. By assumption, ]([ψ]ϕ)
for all ψ ∈LPALint . Then, since x is closed under (DR5), ](2ϕ) ∈ x, i.e., 2ϕ ∈ x as well.
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The definition of the canonical model for APALint is the same as for ELint, except that the maximally
consistent sets are maximally consistent theories. We now come to the Truth Lemma for the logic
APALint. Here we use the complexity measure ψ <Sd ϕ .
Lemma 36 (Truth Lemma) For every ϕ ∈LAPALint and for each x ∈ Xc, ϕ ∈ x iffX c,(x,θ ∗) |= ϕ .
Proof
Let ϕ ∈LAPALint and x∈X c. The proof is by <Sd-induction on ϕ , where the case ϕ = [ψ]χ is proved
by a subinduction on χ . We therefore consider 14 cases.
Case ϕ := p
x ∈ p iff x ∈ νc(p)
iff (x,θ ∗) |= p
Induction Hypothesis (IH): For all formulas ψ ∈LAPALint , if ψ <Sd ϕ , then ψ ∈ x iffX c,(x,θ ∗) |= ψ .
The cases negation, conjunction, and interior modality are as in Truth Lemma 25 for ELint , where
we observe that the subformula order is subsumed in the <Sd order (see Lemma 6.2). We proceed with
the knowledge operator, i.e., case ϕ := Kiψ , and then with the subinduction on χ for case announcement
ϕ := [ψ]χ , and finally with the case ϕ :=2ψ .
Case ϕ := Kiψ
This case is also similar to the one in Truth Lemma 25 for ELint , however, using maximally consistent
theories in the canonical model creates some differences. For the direction from left-to-right, see Truth
Lemma 25. For (⇐), suppose Kiψ 6∈ x. Then, by Lemma 34, there exists a maximally consistent theory
y such that Kix ⊆ y and ψ 6∈ y. By ψ <Sd Kiψ and (IH), (y,θ ∗) 6|= ψ . Since Kix ⊆ y, we have y ∈ [x]i
meaning that y ∈ θ ∗(x)(i). Therefore, by the semantics,X c,(x,θ ∗) 6|= Kiψ .
Case ϕ := [ψ]p
[ψ]p ∈ x iff int(ψ)→ p ∈ x (R1)
iff int(ψ) 6∈ x or p ∈ x Prop. 29
iff (x,θ ∗) 6|= int(ψ) or (x,θ ∗) |= p (∗)
iff (x,θ ∗) |= [ψ]p (R1)
(*): By (IH), int(ψ)<Sd [ψ]p and p <
S
d [ψ]p (Lemma 6.3 and Lemma 6.2).
Case ϕ := [ψ]¬η Use (R2) and (IH) and, by Lemma 6.3 and Lemma 7.1, int(ψ) <Sd [ψ]¬η and
¬[ψ]η <Sd [ψ]¬η .
Case ϕ := [ψ](η ∧σ) Use (R3) and (IH), [ψ]η <Sd [ψ](η ∧σ) and [ψ]σ <Sd [ψ](η ∧σ).
Case ϕ := [ψ]int(η) Use (R4) and (IH) and, by Lemmas 6.3, 7.2, int(ψ) <Sd [ψ]int(η) and
int([ψ]η)<Sd [ψ]int(η).
Case ϕ := [ψ]Kiη Use (R5) and (IH) and, by Lemmas 6.3, 7.3, int(ψ) <Sd [ψ]Kiη and Ki[ψ]η <
S
d
[ψ]Kiη .
Case ϕ := [ψ][η ]σ Use (R6) and (IH) and, by Lemma 7.4, [¬[ψ]¬int(η)]σ <Sd [ψ][η ]σ .
Case ϕ := [ψ]2σ For all η ∈LPALint , [ψ][η ]σ <Sd [ψ]2σ , as [ψ]2σ has one more 2 than [ψ][η ]σ .
Therefore, it suffices to show [ψ]2σ ∈ x iff ∀η ∈LPALint , [ψ][η ]σ ∈ x.
(⇐) Consider the necessity form [ψ]] and assume that for all η ∈LPALint , [ψ][η ]σ ∈ x, i.e., for all
η ∈LPALint , [ψ]]([η ]σ) ∈ x . As x is closed under (DR5), we obtain [ψ]](2σ) ∈ x, i.e., [ψ]2σ ∈ x.
(⇒) Suppose [ψ]2σ ∈ x. We have
`2σ → [η ]σ , for all η ∈LPALint (R7)
` [ψ](2σ → [η ]σ) for all η ∈LPALint (DR4)
` [ψ]2σ → [ψ][η ]σ , for all η ∈LPALint (DR1), (R1-R3)
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Therefore, for all η ∈ LPALint , [ψ][η ]σ ∈ x. As [ψ][η ]σ <Sd [ψ]2σ for all η ∈ LPALint , by (IH), we
have for all η ∈ LPALint ,(x,θ ∗) |= [ψ][η ]σ . Then, by the semantics, we obtain (details omitted) that
(x,θ ∗) |= [ψ]2σ .
Case ϕ :=2ψ Again note that for all η ∈LPALint , [η ]ψ <Sd 2ψ , as 2ψ has one more 2 than [η ]ψ
(see Lemma 6.4 and Lemma 6.5). Therefore, we obtain
2ψ ∈ x iff (∀η ∈LPALint)([η ]ψ ∈ x) Lemma 35
iff (∀η ∈LPALint)(x,θ ∗) |= [η ]ψ (IH)
iff (x,θ ∗) |=2ψ semantics
Theorem 37 APALint is complete with respect to the class of all topo-models.
Proof Let ϕ ∈ LAPALint such that 6` ϕ , i.e., ϕ 6∈ APALint (Recall that APALint is the smallest theory).
Then, by Lemma 32, APALint +¬ϕ is a consistent theory and, by Lemma 31, ¬ϕ ∈ APALint +¬ϕ . By
Lemma 33, the consistent theory APALint +¬ϕ can be extended to a maximally consistent theory y such
that APALint +¬ϕ ⊆ y. Since y is maximally consistent and ¬ϕ ∈ y, we obtain ϕ 6∈ y (by Proposition
29). Then, by Lemma 36 (Truth Lemma),X c,(y,θ ∗) 6|= ϕ .
5 Comparison to other work
Multi-agent epistemic systems with subset space-like semantics have been proposed in [13, 14, 4, 18],
however, none of these are concerned with arbitrary announcements. Our goal in this paper is not to
provide a multi-agent generalization of SSL per se, but to work with the effort-like modality 2 intended
to capture the information change brought about by any announcements (subject to some restrictions) in a
multi-agent setting and modelling it by way of “open-set shrinking” similar to the effort modality, rather
than by deleting states or neighbourhoods, so that the intuitive link between the two becomes more
transparent on a semantic level. In [3], Balbiani et al. proposed subset space semantics for arbitrary
announcements, however, their approach does not go beyond the single-agent case and the semantics
provided is in terms of model restriction. An unorthodox approach to multi-agent knowledge is proposed
in [13, 14]. Roughly speaking, instead of having a knowledge modality Ki for each agent in his syntax,
Heinemann uses additional operators to define Ki and his semantics only validate the S4-axioms for
Ki. The necessitation rule for Ki does not preserve validity under the proposed semantics [13, 14]. In
[18] a multi-agent semantics for knowledge is provided, but no announcements or further generalizations
(unlike in their other, single-agent, work [19]), and not in a topological setting. Their use of partitions for
each agent instead of a single neighbourhood is compatible with our requirement that all neighbourhoods
for a given agent be disjoint. A further difference from the existing literature is that we restrict our
attention to topological spaces and prove our results by means of topological tools.
We applied the new completeness proof for arbitrary public announcement logic of [2] to a topolog-
ical setting. The canonical modal construction is as in [6] with some multi-agent modifications. The
modality int in our system demands a different complexity measure in the Truth Lemma of the complete-
ness proof than in [2].
6 Conclusions
We have proposed topological semantics for the multi-agent extensions of the public announcement logic
of [6], and further extended the logic with arbitrary announcements. We showed topological complete-
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ness of these logics. Our work can be seen as a step toward discovering the interplay between dynamic
epistemic logic and topological reasoning.
For further research, we envisage a finitary axiomatization for APALint wherein the infinitary deriva-
tion rule (DR5) is replaced by a finitary rule. The obvious derivation rule would derive something after
any announcement if it can be derived after announcing a fresh variable [1]. Under subset space seman-
tics, it is unclear how to prove that this rule is sound.
We are still investigating expressivity and (un)decidability. If the logic APALint is undecidable, this
would contrast nicely with the undecidability of arbitrary public announcement logic. Otherwise, there
may be interesting decidable versions when restricting the class of models to particular topologies.
The logic APALint is also axiomatizable on the class where the K modalities have S4 properties, a
result we have not reported in this paper for consistency of presentation. This class is of topological
interest.
In our setup all agents have the same observational powers. If agents can have different observational
powers, we can associate a topology with each agent and generalize the logic to an arbitrary epistemic
action logic.
Furthermore, we would like to explore the exact difference between the effort modality and the
arbitrary announcement modality (in the single agent case, see [10]) by constructing a topological model
which distinguishes the two: a topological model might have more than epistemically definable opens
with respect to the proposed semantics.
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